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Hypothetical trolley problems are widely used to elicit moral intuitions, which are employed
in the development of moral theory and the psychological study of moral judgments.
The scenarios used are outlandish, and some philosophers and psychologists have
questioned whether the judgments made in such unrealistic and unfamiliar scenarios are
a reliable basis for theory-building. We present two experiments that investigate whether
differences in moral judgment due to the role of the agent, previously found in a standard
trolley scenario, persist when the structure of the problem is transplanted to a more
familiar context. Our first experiment compares judgments in hypothetical scenarios; our
second experiment operationalizes some of those scenarios in the laboratory, allowing
us to observe judgments about decisions that are really being made. In the hypothetical
experiment, we found that the role effect reversed in our more familiar context, both
in judgments about what the actor ought to do and in judgments about the moral
rightness of the action. However, in our laboratory experiment, the effects reversed back
or disappeared. Among judgments of what the actor ought to do, we found the same
role effect as in the standard hypothetical trolley scenario, but the effect of role on moral
judgments disappeared.
Keywords: context effects, decision making, hypothetical scenarios, responsibility, trolley problems
INTRODUCTION
Psychologists and philosophers use hypothetical dilemmas to
elicit moral judgments (e.g., Kamm, 1996; Greene et al., 2001;
Rozyman and Baron, 2002; Cushman et al., 2006; Schaich Borg
et al., 2006; Waldmann and Dieterich, 2007; Nadelhoffer and
Feltz, 2008). Psychologists aim to discover the factors that influ-
ence judgments, while philosophers use their intuitions to inform
moral theorizing. The scenarios are typically fairly outlandish,
involving events that are unlikely to occur in everyday life, and
mostly concern life and death decisions. For instance, trolley prob-
lems are a family of moral dilemmas devised by philosophers in
order in order to investigate why it is permissible to cause a harm
to one in order to save many in some circumstances but not in
others (Foot, 1967; Thomson, 1976, 1985). The paradigm trolley
problem is Side-track: there is a runaway train that threatens to kill
five men on the track ahead. An agent can save the five by switch-
ing a lever that will divert the trolley onto a side-track. However,
on the side-track is oneman, who would be killed. The question is
whether it is morally permissible for the agent to save the five and
kill the one. Other trolley problems, which are often contrasted to
Side-track, vary the details about how the five are saved and the
one killed.
In the original version of the trolley problem suggested by Foot
(1967), the agent was the driver of the trolley. Thomson changed
the agent to a passenger (Thomson, 1976) and later to a bystander
(Thomson, 1985). One of the reasons that she gave for the change
in role is that, as the “captain of the trolley,” the driver is in
a special position, being “charged by the trolley company with
responsibility for the safety of his passengers and anyone else who
might be harmed by the trolley he drives” (Thomson, 1985, p.
1397). In contrast, the bystander at the switch “is a private per-
son who just happens to be there” (Thomson, 1985; p. 1397). The
other reason Thomson gave is that the driver, by driving a trol-
ley into the five, would be killing them. Hence the driver faces
a choice between killing five and killing one. However, the other
scenarios to which the driver is being compared involve the choice
between killing one and letting five die—the predicament that is
faced by the passenger and the bystander.
Thomson’s bystander is now the paradigm trolley problem, but
versions in which a passenger can turn the train onto a side-track
have also attracted some attention from philosophers (Quinn,
1989) and psychologists (Hauser et al., 2007). Being a passenger
or a bystander might also affect what the agent in the scenario
ought to do. Passengers are more involved in the situation than
bystanders, for whom doing nothing is, arguably, just staying out
of it. Specifically, we might think of bystanders as onlookers, who
are unexpectedly given the chance to intervene and re-direct a
threat, whereas passengers are already participants in the situation,
without being one of the people who are directly affected by the
threat.
Previous experiments show that people’s moral judgments
about turning the train in Side-track are affected by the agent’s
role, as a passenger or a bystander. Pulford et al. (2012) found
that 84% of subjects judged that it was morally permissible for
the agent to turn the train down a side-track when she was a
passenger, compared to 65% (significantly fewer) when she was
a bystander. The passenger scenario replicated a dilemma from
Hauser et al. (2007), which elicited a higher level of agreement
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that it is morally permissible to turn the train (85%) than
their other scenarios, some of which were bystander scenarios—
although they did not include a bystander version of Side-track.
Side-track is one of the less outlandish versions of the trolley
problem. It has even been known to occur in real life (CNN U.S.,
2003). However, it is hardly a familiar occurrence. Another popu-
lar version, introduced by Thomson (1985), is Footbridge, where
the agent can save the five by pushing a large man off a footbridge
in front of the train, stopping the train but killing the one. As well
as imagining an unusual scenario, responding to the Footbridge
dilemma involves suspending disbelief that a large person—even
one sometimes described as wearing a backpack—would be solid
andmassive enough to stop a train. Arguably the most far-fetched
trolley problem is Frances Kamm’s (1996, p. 154) Lazy Susan case,
where the five and the one are seated on opposite sides of a giant
lazy Susan, which the agent can rotate in order to save the five
from the train but, in doing so, puts the one in its path.
Philosophers claim to elicit “common sense intuitions” from
these scenarios, which they can use in constructing moral theo-
ries (Kamm, 1989; p. 227). Those moral theories are presumably
supposed to be applicable to everyday moral decisions. However,
Woodward and Allman (2007) argue that reliable judgments are
the result of learning processes (which may be implicit) with
corrective feedback, where feedback could include the experi-
ence of others, historical situations, or learning from cases that
are analogous to the situation being assessed. Highly unrealis-
tic cases such as trolley problems do not meet this criterion,
and Woodward and Allman caution against their use in moral
theorizing.
There are several reasons why there may be differences in
performance between unrealistic scenarios and real life. One pos-
sibility is that mental processes which are adapted to everyday
environments perform poorly when tested in an unusual context.
This argument is similar to Gigerenzer’s external validity critique
of the heuristics and biases literature (Gigerenzer et al., 1999). A
second possibility is that unusual scenarios may not elicit nor-
mal strategies and thought processes. In real life, moral cognition
usually operates swiftly and implicitly, and the “extreme and unfa-
miliar situations such as those posed by classic moral dilemmas
could evoke unusual strategies and thought processes rather than
those typically used for common moral judgments” (Knutson
et al., 2010; p. 379). This has led some psychologists to argue that
ecological validity is crucial for studying moral judgment (Moll
et al., 2005).
Most dilemmas used in research on moral judgments involve
the causing or preventing of deaths, which is far from most
people’s everyday experience. Gold et al. (2013) found that the
standard pattern of intuitions was preserved in hypothetical sce-
narios that were analogous to Side-track and Footbridge, but
where the outcomes were economic harms, such as loss of a
job, income, or property damage. This suggests the possibility of
investigating judgments in trolley problems that are more familiar
from everyday life. It also raises the possibility of operational-
izing trolley problems in the laboratory, with subjects making
moral judgments about decisions that are actually being taken,
whose outcomes affect the distribution of small economic harms.
It is standard to use small economic incentives in behavioral
economics, including in the study of games that elicit moral
behaviors such as altruism, fairness, trust, cooperation, and reci-
procity (e.g., Berg et al., 1995; Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton
and Ockenfels, 2000; Andreoni and Miller, 2002; Andreoni et al.,
2002; Fehr and Schmidt, 2006).
We present two experiments designed to test whether intu-
itions about agent role effects in trolley problems are preserved in
more familiar scenarios and in real decision-making situations1.
We took the decision structure of Side-track, where an agent has
the possibility of diverting a threat to five people with the side-
effect of harming one, and transplanted it to a scenario involving
a game show, a context that is familiar to most people who have
watched television. The harm that would befall the one and the
five involved loss of money rather than loss of life. In Study 1,
we used hypothetical scenarios and we compared role effects in
judgments in our game show scenario to those in the standard
scenario, where the decision is whether or not to turn a train. In
Study 2 we operationalized the game show scenario in the labora-
tory, allowing us to elicit judgments in real time about a decision
that was actually being taken.
STUDY 1
We conducted a between-subjects experiment, varying the agent’s
role in the scenario, onlooker vs. participant, and the context of
the decision. In one condition, we used the standard context of
the runaway train. In the others, we changed the context to that
of a game show, in which the agent can save five contestants from
being knocked out and losing their winnings but, as a side effect,
this leads to one other contestant being knocked out. Game shows
where contestants are knocked out during the course of the game,
and where contestants may have to leave the show forfeiting their
winnings, are a familiar staple of television.
As well as comparing the train to a game show, we manipu-
lated the level of the loss in the game show scenarios, comparing
the large game show scenario, where the contestants stood to
lose £200,000 (more than the average price of a house in the
UK), to the small game show scenario, where the contestants
stood to lose £10. We elicited judgments about the rightness of
the action and about what the agent should do, and we asked
subjects about the agent’s responsibility for taking the action
as well as about various other factors which may be relevant
to moral judgment, and about how believable they found the
scenario.
METHODS
Subjects
There were 1215 subjects: 359 men, 761 women, and 95 peo-
ple who did not disclose their gender. Subjects were mainly
voluntary visitors to an on-line survey, which they completed
in their own time, after following a link to a SurveyGizmo
online data collection website. The survey was promoted online,
including at http://psych.hanover.edu/research/exponnet.html,
and through UK university e-mail lists. There were 31 sub-
jects who voluntarily participated in a pen and paper version
1We had originally hoped to compare Side-track and Footbridge, but we
struggled to come up with any real life examples of dilemmas with a similar
structure to Footbridge—grist to the mill of Woodward and Allman’s (2007)
argument.
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distributed in an undergraduate philosophy class at the University
of Edinburgh. Subjects were not paid for their participation. The
majority of the subjects (67%) were British or American, the
rest came from all over the world; 75% spoke English as their
native language. Subjects were aged between 18 and 72 years
(M = 24.87, SD = 8.83).
Materials
We compared six scenarios in a 2 (Role: onlooker vs. par-
ticipant) × 3 (Context: train vs. large game vs. small game)
experimental design. The train scenarios were based on the
standard trolley problem where the agent has the possibility
of turning a train onto a side-track, saving five lives at the
cost of one. We varied whether the agent was a bystander on
the tracks (onlooker) or a passenger on the train (participant
in the scenario). Phrases in italics indicate variations between
conditions, onlooker/participant:
Peter is taking his daily walk near the train tracks when he sees a
runaway train approaching with no driver/a passenger on a train
whose driver has just shouted that the brakes have failed, and who
then fainted of shock. The train is moving so fast that anyone it hits
will die immediately. There are five people working on the main
track. It is obvious that they will not be able to get off the track in
time and, if nothing is done, they will be killed.
The track has a side-track leading off to the left. Peter is stand-
ing next to a lever. If he pulls the lever, that will/Peter can turn the
train onto the side track and the five people on the main track will
not die. But a person is working on the side track. If the train goes
onto the side track, then the person on the side track will die. Peter
is aware of all these facts.
Thus, Peter can pull the lever, in which case the one person will
die but the five people will not; or Peter can refrain from pulling
the lever, in which case the five people will die but the one person
will not.
In the game show scenarios, we moved the action to a game
show and varied whether the agent was an audience member
(onlooker) or a contestant (a participant). Phrases in italics
indicate variations between conditions (onlooker/participant) and
large/small loss:
Peter is a member of the studio audience watching/contestant on
a game show. Five contestants have each earned £200,000/ £10
prize money by answering questions over several rounds, and their
tokens are nearing the winning side of the game board. A ball is
suddenly released and is rolling toward the tokens of the five con-
testants and, if nothing is done, they will be knocked out of the
game and lose their prize money.
Peter sees that a button on his armrest has just lit up to indicate
that he has been randomly selected by computer to take part in the
show. Peter has the option to press the/a button and knock the ball
onto another path. But another contestant, who has also earned
£200,000/ £10 prize money, has a token on the new path and will
be knocked out of the game and lose his prize money. Whether
or not he presses the button will not affect Peter’s winnings. Peter is
aware of all these facts.
Procedure
Subjects were randomly allocated to read only one of the six
scenarios. After reading the scenario subjects were asked:
(1) Is it morally wrong for Peter to turn the train/press the but-
ton? (Yes/No) and to rate the moral right or wrongness of
the action on a seven point scale (-3 Definitely wrong to +3
Definitely right).
(2) Should Peter pull the lever/press the button? (Yes/No).
(3) To what extent is it Peter’s responsibility to turn the train/press
the button?, rated on a seven point scale (-3 Not at all to +3
Totally).
(4) Assuming that Peter pulled the lever/pressed the button, to
what extent do you agree with the following statements:
• Peter intended that the person on the side track would
die/contestant with the token on the new path would lose their
prize money
• Peter is to blame for the death of the person on the side-track/loss
of the prize money of the contestant with the token on the new
path
• Peter caused the death of the person on the side-track/loss of the
prize money of the contestant with the token on the new path
• Peter intentionally killed the person on the side-track/lost the
prize money of the contestant with the token on the new path
These were all rated on a rated on a seven point scale (1 strongly
disagree, to 7 strongly agree).
(5) How believable is this scenario? Rated on a seven point scale
(1 Not at all believable, to 7 Completely believable).
RESULTS
Some subjects did not answer all the survey questions. We did not
want to create a sample selection bias by only analyzing data from
subjects who completed the whole experiment, so the degrees of
freedom in the analyses vary depending on how many subjects
responded to the question being analyzed.
Believability of contexts
Our aim of using the game shows to provide a more realistic
context was successful. A Two-Way ANOVA revealed a signifi-
cant main effect of context on judgments of how believable the
scenario was: F(2, 1134) = 51.96, p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.084. Tukey
post-hoc tests revealed that the train context (M = 3.16) was sig-
nificantly less believable than the two game show contexts (large
game show M = 4.18, small game show M = 4.45), both p <
0.001. On average, subjects rated all the game show scenarios
as believable and the train scenarios as unbelievable. There was
also a significant main effect of role, with the onlooker scenarios
rated as less believable (M = 3.67) than the participant scenar-
ios (M = 4.16): F(1, 1134) = 19.89, p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.017. There
was no significant interaction.
Ratings of “how believable is this scenario?” had a negligible
correlation with moral judgment, r(1137) = 0.062, p = 0.037.
Moral judgments
A Two-Way ANOVA showed a significant interaction effect of
context and role on rightness judgments: F(2, 1175) = 7.98, p <
0.001, ηp2 = 0.013 (See Figure 1 for the mean ratings in each
scenario). There was no main effect of context, F(2, 1181) = 2.33,
p = 0.098, or of role, F(1, 1181) = 2.76, p = 0.097.
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FIGURE 1 | Mean moral rightness ratings (−3 Definitely wrong to +3
Definitely right).
A simple effects analysis across the contexts shows that there
was a difference in the way that subjects rated the action of the
participant, F(2, 1175) = 9.44, p < 0.001, but not of the onlooker,
F(2, 1175) = 1.34, p = 0.261. In the train context, subjects rated
the action as more right if the actor was a participant than an
onlooker, F(1, 1175) = 4.18, p = 0.041, but in the large game show
context this effect was reversed and the actions of a participant
(contestant) were rated as less right than those of an onlooker
(audience member), F(1, 1175) = 12.78, p < 0.001. There was no
effect of role in the small game show context F(1, 1175) = 1.93,
p = 0.165.
Judgments of whether or not Peter should pull the lever/press
the button differed across the six conditions: χ2(5, 1184) = 23.21,
p < 0.001, ϕc = 0.14. These results are summarized in Figure 2.
Pairwise comparisons show that the difference between onlook-
ers and participants is highly significant in the train scenario,
χ2(1, 400) = 8.51, p = 0.004, ϕc = 0.146, and the large game show
scenario, χ2(1, 419) = 6.33, p = 0.012, ϕc = 0.123, but narrowly
failed to reach conventional levels of significance in the small game
show scenario: χ2(1, 365) = 3.38, p = 0.066, ϕc = 0.096. In the
train scenarios, more people judged that the participant should
take the action than the onlooker, but in the game show scenar-
ios more people thought that the onlooker (audience member)
should take the action than the participant (contestant). This is
the same pattern as the moral judgments.
Relation of responsibility, causation, intention, intentionality, and
blame to moral judgment
If we look at how each of the factors varies with role and context,
using Two-Way ANOVAs, then we find that subjects gave higher
ratings for caused, intentionally, intended, and blame in the game
show scenarios than in the train, all p < 0.001 (see Table 1). [The
same pattern of results is obtained from a regression analysis. We
present partial correlation coefficients in order to make it clear
that we make no claims about the direction of causality, which is
contested. For opposing views about the direction of causality see
Hauser et al. (2007) and Knobe (2010).] There are no significant
differences for responsible, and no effect of role on any of these
factors, or any interaction effects.
FIGURE 2 | Percentage of subjects who judged that Peter should pull
the lever/press the button.
Table 1 | Mean (and standard deviation) of factor ratings in the
scenarios.
Context Factor
Intended Intentionally Caused Blame Responsible
Train 3.10
(2.17)
2.69
(2.07)
4.31
(2.09)
3.25
(2.16)
0.06
(1.93)
Large
game show
3.68
(1.97)
3.79
(1.95)
4.97
(1.86)
4.10
(1.99)
0.07
(1.95)
Small game
show
3.74
(1.95)
3.85
(1.98)
5.20
(1.80)
4.37
(1.98)
−0.14
(1.97)
Notes: Responsible rated on a seven point scale (−3 Not at all to +3 Totally),
others all rated on a rated on a seven point scale (1 strongly disagree, to 7
strongly agree). For all factors apart from responsibility, means for the game
show contexts are different from the mean for the train, p < 0.001. The means
for each factor do not differ between the large and small game show contexts.
Table 2 | Partial correlations of the five factors with moral rightness
rating.
Intended Intentionally Caused Blame Responsible
−0.038
p = 0.206
0.009
p = 0.769
0.056
p = 0.062
−0.164
p < 0.001
0.373
p < 0.001
When we look at the partial correlation coefficients, control-
ling for the presence of the other variables, we find that only blame
and responsible are correlated with the moral judgment of right-
ness (see Table 2), but intended, intentionally and caused are all
correlated with blame (see Table 3).
DISCUSSION
We found a difference in moral judgment associated with the
role of the actor in the scenario, who was the target of the judg-
ment, but the direction of this difference changed depending on
the context. In the standard train context, subjects judged that it
was more morally right for a passenger, who was already involved
in the situation, to turn the train than a bystander, who was an
onlooker just passing by. In the game show contexts, it was judged
more right for audience members, who were onlookers, than
players, who were participating in the quiz, to press the button.
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Table 3 | Partial correlations of the five factors with each other.
Factors Intended Intentionally Cause Blame Responsible
Intentionally 0.469, p < 0.001 1.00
Caused −0.064, p = 0.031 0.272, p < 0.001 1.00
Blame 0.144, p < 0.001 0.121, p < 0.001 0.467, p < 0.001 1.00
Responsible 0.038, p = 0.197 −0.010, p = 0.727 −0.053, p = 0.073 0.055, p = 0.066 1.00
Subjects’ judgments of what the person in the scenario ought to
do followed the same pattern as their moral judgments.
Subjects ascribed a higher degree of causation, intentionality,
intention, and blame for the harm in the game show than in the
train context. When we tested for relationships between each of
these factors and moral judgment, whilst controlling for the other
factors, we found that blame was the only factor that both corre-
lated withmoral judgment and differentiated the game show from
the train context. In turn, the increased blame was related to the
actors in the game show being rated higher than those in the train
scenario on whether they caused the harm, intended the harm,
and brought about the harm to the one intentionally. Hence our
data suggest that the relation between moral intuitions and inten-
tionality found by Sinnott-Armstrong et al. (2008) and between
moral intuitions and intention, proposed by Mikhail (2007) and
found by Hauser et al. (2007), is mediated by differential placing
of blame.
Responsibility for taking the action correlated with moral
judgments when the other factors were controlled. However,
responsibility ratings did not differ between the train and the
game show contexts. Thus, Thomson’s (1985) suggestion that
moral intuitions are related to placing of responsibility is sup-
ported, although it does not seem that participants have a greater
responsibility to take the action than onlookers.
Causes of the reversal
There are two salient differences between the train and the game
show scenarios: we changed the context from a train to a game
show, and the harmful consequence from death to an economic
loss. We think that the reversal of the role effect relates to the
change in context, rather than the use of economic harms.
Other studies have replicated trolley results using economic
harms. Standard patterns of judgments are seen when economic
harms are substituted for mortal harms in hypothetical Side-
track and Footbridge scenarios (Gold et al., 2013), and when
those judgments are being made about decisions in real Side-
track and Footbridge scenarios, involving small economic harms
(Gold et al., submitted). Therefore the reversal of the role effect
in our hypothetical scenarios seems likely to be related to the
change in context, rather than the substituting of economic harm
for mortal harms.
Nor do we think that the reversal we found is related to the fact
that the game show winnings have been acquired during a show
that has not yet ended. One obvious thought is that game show
winnings are “funny money,” regarded as not really in the posses-
sion of the winner, at least for the duration of the show. However
Post et al. (2008) analyzed the behavior of contestants on the tele-
vision show “Deal or No Deal?” and found that it was consistent
with a prospect theory model where decision-makers incorpo-
rate expected winnings into their reference point (although the
adjustment of the reference point was lagged). This result was
not limited to the high stake television game show. It was repli-
cated in classroom experiments with stakes that were 1000 and
10,000 times lower than those on TV. What contestants regard as
their current wealth is based on their expectations of how much
they will take home, and diminished expectations of winnings
represent losses.
The change in context may have affected the causal
model that subjects used when representing the problems to
themselves—it certainly affected their ascriptions of causation
and intentionality—and changing the causal model may affect
moral judgments (Spranca et al., 1991; Pizarro et al., 2003;
Waldmann and Dieterich, 2007). Whether causation really varies
between the train and the game show contexts is a matter for
debate. The scenarios were designed so that the explicit causal
structures are the same in both contexts. However, the two con-
texts may have evoked different background assumptions, for
example that, in a game show, there are humans involved in run-
ning the show who have a causal role in the outcomes and who
may bear some blame, whereas in the train context there is no
obvious person who is causally responsible or to blame for the
malfunction of the train.
The two contexts may also have differed with respect to which
agents are perceived to have the right to cause the harm: the
participant (passenger) in the train context but the onlooker
(audience member) in the game show. People who say that
they would not turn the trolley give reasons including not hav-
ing the right to decide and not wanting to be responsible for
someone’s death (Gold et al., 2014). Similarly, people who say
that they would not vaccinate their child if there was a risk
of death cite being responsible for any negative consequence of
the action (Ritov and Baron, 1990). (Being responsible for the
bad consequence is subtly different from the question we asked,
about being responsible for acting, and having the right to act
is clearly different from having the responsibility—or duty—
to act). Having rights and responsibilities can be connected to
the social roles we occupy (Baron, 1996), so the right thing
to do in dilemmas with similar structures can be sensitive to
context.
STUDY 2
In our second study we operationalized the small game show in
a laboratory setting. We conducted a quiz, which subjects either
took part in (players) or watched (audience), with monetary
prizes for all players who correctly completed more than 15 out of
20 questions. Once at least six players had answered enough ques-
tions correctly to collect prizes, we paused the quiz and threatened
to knock out five of them, who would lose their winnings. The
actor had to decide whether to press a button to keep them in,
with the side-effect that we would knock one, different player
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out of the quiz, who would lose his or her winnings. We varied
whether the actor was a player or an audience member.
This enabled us to investigate whether the role of the actor,
who was the target of judgment, would affect judgments in a
real life scenario (Target Role: target player vs. target audience).
We also varied the role of the subjects who were making the
judgments, (Subject Role: player vs. audience).
Since we had to have some subjects making the decisions that
were being judged, we were also able to observe behavior and to
compare the judgments of actors, who made decisions and judged
the morality of their own decision, with those of observers, who
made judgments about the action of an actor (Decision Making
Power: actor vs. observer). Actors always made judgments about
their own action, so we did not cross subject role and target role
for actors.
In Study 1, our questions were all about a third person
(“should Peter/a passenger press the button?”). In Study 2, the
actors were asked about their own actions and the observers were
asked about a third person (“should the player/audience member
press the button?”). Hence the nearest equivalent to the difference
investigated in Study 1 is when the subject is an observer and the
target role is varied, target player vs. target audience.
METHODS
Subjects
There were 202 subjects, 105men, and 97 women. They were aged
between 18 and 56 years (M = 22.02, SD = 6.11). Subjects were
recruited through the University of Leicester’s online e-bulletin,
which goes out to staff and students. They were tested in groups
of 35–40.
Procedure and materials
Subjects sat at computer terminals in one large room and took
part in a quiz show (see Figure 3). We randomly selected 60%
of the subjects to be players, taking part in a general knowledge
quiz, and they were assigned pseudonyms. The other 40% were
the audience, watching the quiz on their screens. The audience
saw the questions in real time and watched the progress of avatars,
representing the players, moving across the screen. Players who
answered fifteen questions correctly entered the winning zone.
Subjects were told that any player who was in the winning zone
at the end of the quiz would get £10, and any player who correctly
answered nineteen or twenty questions would receive £15. At the
end of the experiment, players were paid their winnings, or a £5
show-up fee if they won nothing. Audience members were paid
£5 for their participation.
Once six players had entered the winning zone, the quiz
stopped. The six players in the zone received a screenmessage say-
ing “please wait.” These players took no decisions and thus these
36 subjects provided no further data to the experiment. Other
players received a screenmessage, whose content depended on the
condition that they were in.
Actors (both players and audience members) received the
following message:
Five of the players who are in the winning zone are about to
be knocked out of the game by the experimenter and will each
lose their £10 cash winnings. You can stop the five from losing
their winnings by pressing the button below. However, in that case
the experimenter will knock out a different player who is in the
winning zone, and the one player will lose his/her £10 cash.
Those actors who were players were also told:
Whether or not you press the button won’t affect your winnings.
If you are in the winning zone, then you are not one of the players
who is affected by this decision.
Observers received the following message, phrases in italics var-
ied, depending on whether the actor whose behavior was being
judged was a player or an audience member:
Five of the players who are in the winning zone are about to be
knocked out of the game by the experimenter and will each lose
their £10 cash winnings. Another of the players/An audience mem-
ber is being given the option of pressing a button to stop the five
from losing their winnings. However, in that case the experimenter
will knock out a different player who is in the winning zone, and
the one player will lose his/her £10 cash.
In addition, those who were judging a player were also told:
Whether or not the player presses the button won’t affect his/her
winnings. If s/he is in the winning zone, then s/he is not one of the
players who is affected by the decision and s/he knows this.
Actors then had 60 s to decide whether or not to push the button.
Observers were asked how strongly they agreed with the state-
ment: The player/audience member should press the button, rated
on a nine point scale (1 Strongly disagree to 9 Strongly agree).
Subjects were then asked to indicate how wrong or how right it
would have been to press the button, on a scale from 1 (Definitely
wrong) to 9 (Definitely right).
At the beginning of the experiment, subjects had been told
that “In this experiment some decisions will affect other subjects’
payments and some will not,” and one randomly selected actor’s
decision was implemented to see who got knocked out, the one
player or the five.
RESULTS
Among actors, the decision to press the button or not was unaf-
fected by whether the person given the choice was a player
(78.57% pressed it) or audience member (76.67% pressed it),
χ2(1, 58) = 0.030, p = 0.862, ϕc = 0.023. Thus it seems that being
a part of the quiz did not increase the proportion of people will-
ing to press the button compared to the people who were merely
watching it.
Observers’ judgments of whether the actor should press the
button were affected by their own roles, as player or audi-
ence member (see Figure 4). We examined the mean ratings of
whether the observers thought that the actor should press the
button (1 strongly disagree to 9 strongly agree) as the depen-
dent variable in a Two-Way ANOVA with Subject Role (player
vs. audience) and Target Role (target player vs. target audience)
as independent variables. There was a main effect of Subject
Role, with audience members agreeing more strongly that the
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FIGURE 3 | Example of a subject’s monitor displaying the questions and the progress of the quiz show subjects.
FIGURE 4 | Mean rating of “The player/audience member should press
the button” (1 Strongly disagree to 9 Strongly agree).
actor should press the button (M = 5.92) than the players (M =
4.79), F(1, 104) = 5.12, p = 0.026, η2p = 0.047. On average, audi-
ence members believed that the actor should press the button
(mean rating above 5), but players did not (mean rating below
5). Regarding the Target Role, there was a trend for the player
to be judged higher than the audience member (5.80 vs. 4.91),
p = 0.075, η2p = 0.030. Our subjects believed, on average, that the
player should press the button (mean rating above 5), but that the
audience member should not (mean rating below 5). Note that
this trend is in the opposite direction of the effect we found in
Study 1. There was no interaction between the two factors.
If we group the observers into those who judged that the actor
should not take the action (those who gave a rating from 1 to 4)
FIGURE 5 | Percentage of actors who pressed the button, and
percentage of observers who judged that their target should press the
button, broken down by the role of the subject and the role of the
target.
and those who judged that s/he should (rating from 6 to 9), we
can more easily compare the data to both the actions of the actors
(see Figure 5).
Actors were more likely to take action than observers were
to judge that they should. The only condition where judgments
about what should be done corresponded to what was actually
done was that of the audience members whose judgment targeted
a player.
There was also an effect due to the role of the person mak-
ing the judgment. Observers’ judgments of whether or not the
target should press the button differed across the four con-
ditions: χ2(3, 91) = 8.07, p = 0.044, ϕc = 0.298. The observer’s
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judgments differ depending on the role of the subject, (67.4% of
the observers who are audience members say the target should
press the button and 46.7% of the observer players say the target
should press the button), χ2(1, 91) = 3.99, p = 0.046 ϕc = 0.209,
and depending on the target of judgment, (46.7% of the observers
think that the audience members should press the button and
67.4% think that players should press the button),χ2(1, 91) = 3.99,
p = 0.046, ϕc = 0.209. This grouping corroborates the pattern
found in the ratings: there was a clear reversal of the target-role
effect found in the hypothetical game shows in Study 1. In Study
1, subjects were more likely to say that the audience members
should press the button, whereas in Study 2, the observers (whose
positions correspond most closely to the subjects in Study 1) are
more likely to say that the player should take action than the
audience member.
The rating of how right or wrong pressing the button was did
not vary according to whether the subject was an actor or an
observer (M = 4.22 vs. 4.45), F(1, 160) = 0.13, p = 0.722, or with
Subject Role, audience or player, (M = 4.10 vs. 4.65), F(1, 160) =
2.71, p = 0.101, or Target Role, audience or player, (M = 4.48 vs.
4.27), F(1, 160) = 1.19, p = 0.276, nor was there any interaction
between these factors. In every condition, the average right-wrong
judgment fell on the “wrong” side of the scale yet, in three out of
four of the observer conditions, a majority of subjects judged that
the actor should press the button, and a large majority of actors
pressed the button.
DISCUSSION
In Study 2, we operationalized the small game show from Study
1, and the target-role effect in “should” judgments reversed back
to being in the same direction as the judgments in the hypo-
thetical train context: when the target was a player more subjects
thought that s/he should press the button than when the target
was an audience member. Our results are consistent with other
evidence that real moral decisions can dramatically contradict
moral choices made in hypothetical scenarios (FeldmanHall et al.,
2012b).
A key difference between our real and realistic scenarios is that
actually being in the scenario may have evoked a “hot” affec-
tive state whereas contemplating the same hypothetical scenario
is done in an affectively “cold” state. Differences in affective states
between real and hypothetical scenarios could cause judgments
and behavior to be different (Kühberger et al., 2002; Kang and
Camerer, 2013). People are probably not even aware that their
judgments would differ in real and hypothetical scenarios because
there is a “hot/ cold empathy gap,” where people mispredict the
effect of their affective state on their preferences and behavior
(Loewenstein, 2005). Yet, in a real task, manipulating whether
participants are in “hot” or “cold” states affects behavior, with the
“hot” version being associated with more risk taking and poorer
information use (Figner et al., 2009).
The importance of affective states is supported by neuroscien-
tific evidence. Real and hypothetical moral decisions differentially
recruit neural circuitry, with hypothetical moral decisions elic-
iting activity in neural circuits that are involved in imagination,
whilst real moral decisions activate the amygdala, which is cru-
cial for social and affective processes (FeldmanHall et al., 2012a).
There is also increased activity in the amygdala when subjects are
presented with stories that narrate their own intentional violation
of social norms, compared to violations by others; this has been
linked to enhanced emotional responses (Berthoz et al., 2006).
Others have stressed the importance of emotional reactions in
trolley problems (e.g., Greene et al., 2001) and “hot” affect may
connect our outlandish and real scenarios. The outlandish trolley
scenario may elicit a strong emotional response because the hypo-
thetical outcomes involve deaths; the real scenario may evoke an
emotional response because the small harms will actually occur.
So both the outlandish and the real scenarios may have provoked
a more emotional response than the realistic scenarios. Thus we
observed similar patterns of responses in the outlandish and the
real scenarios and a different pattern in the realistic scenarios.
There was also a difference in judgments depending on the
role of the subject making the judgment: audience members
were more likely to judge that the actor should press the but-
ton. Audience members and players might have differentially
empathized with the one player who risked being knocked out,
with players being more likely to think “what if it were me?”
Interestingly, when observers judge people in the same role as
themselves—when players judge players and audience members
judge audience members—57% of both groups think that the
actor should press the button. It is when these two groups
judge people from a different role that stark differences appear.
When audience members judge players 78% of them think the
player should press the button, a figure that matches almost
precisely the number of actors who actually do take action. In
contrast, only 36% of the players think that an audience mem-
ber should press the button to save the five from losing their
money, thus indicating that the majority of players feel that
the audience members should stay out of the situation and not
intervene.
Actors consistently pressed the button, and more actors
pressed the button than observers said should press the button.
We did not ask actors for their judgment about what they should
do, as it risked merely eliciting self-justificatory answers. If the
observers’ judgments are indicative of what actors thought they
should do, then many actors pressed the button despite think-
ing that they ought not to. This is a case of weakness of will.
Alternatively, if actors acted in line with their judgments about
what they ought to do, then having the power to make a deci-
sion affects one’s judgment about what ought to be done. In either
case, it appears that asking an observer what should be done gets
different results from observing actual actions.
Despite the difference in opinions about what should be done
amongst observers, there are no differences in moral judgments
between the groups in Study 2. Different patterns of hypotheti-
cal choice and moral judgments have also been found by Tassy
et al. (2013), who hypothesize that this occurs because choice
and judgment are the results of different psychological processes;
and different patterns of actual choice and moral judgments
have been found by Gold et al. (submitted), who suggest that
their subjects found that the normatively relevant factors for
whether or not to press the button were not exhausted by its
moral right and wrongness. There may be pragmatic factors
in play.
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GENERAL DISCUSSION
We found differences inmoral judgments between outlandish and
realistic hypothetical scenarios, and between judgments made in
hypothetical scenarios vs. the same scenarios operationalized in
real-life. Of course, showing that there are differing responses
cannot tell us which responses are “correct” or which type of
scenarios we should study (Elqayam and Evans, 2011). But we
can outline some of the advantages and disadvantages of each
approach.
Researchers may choose to use outlandish artificial dilemmas,
rather than realistic ones, in order to isolate the dimensions that
are of theoretical interest (Hauser et al., 2007). Real life scenarios
are usually complex, so isolating dimensions of interest gener-
ally necessitates using outlandish scenarios. Some researchers see
subjects’ lack of familiarity with the outlandish scenarios as a fur-
ther point in their favor, because it removes some of the social
and personal factors that might otherwise influence responses
(Hauser et al., 2007). But both of these supposed benefits are
contested, particularly when dilemmas are used in ethics. There
is a move, especially in medical ethics, to see moral dilemmas as
occurring within a broader narrative, so their resolution requires
moral imagination and a more holistic engagement with all the
features of the case (Hunter, 1996; London, 2001). There are also
arguments that we can be most sure of our moral judgments
when we contemplate complicated and familiar cases: either par-
ticular paradigm cases, such as landmark legal cases (Jonsen and
Toulmin, 1988), or familiar situations (Woodward and Allman,
2007).
Real and hypothetical dilemmas may put subjects in different
affective states (Kühberger et al., 2002; Kang and Camerer, 2013).
There is disagreement whether subjects should be in “hot” or
“cold” states when moral judgments are elicited. Real-life moral
cognition is hot cognition and, if hot and cold judgments dif-
fer, especially if they involve different brain systems, it follows
that psychological studies of moral cognition would benefit from
being done in ecologically valid settings (Casebeer, 2003; Moll
et al., 2005). However, when judgments are used for philosophical
purposes, it has been argued that we should be wary of judgments
that are driven by “ ‘alarm bell’ emotion” (Greene, 2007, p.63),
which suggests privileging “cold” judgments.
Researchers should bear in mind that whether scenarios are
outlandish, realistic, or real may affect moral judgments. But
which type of scenarios is most appropriate to use may depend
on the nature and purpose of the study. Furthermore, a com-
plete understanding of the significant differences reported in our
experiments will, of course, require a great deal more research,
and the potential explanations are myriad. It is even possible, fol-
lowing a suggestion made by Skinner (1985) in a generalized cri-
tique of cognitive science, that the differences could be explained
by people’s application of patterns of behavior learnt under con-
tingencies of reinforcement in analogous situations experienced
in everyday life. However, such purely behavioral explanations are
bound to exist alongside interpretations in cognitive and ethical
terms.
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